Equal Protection and the Inheritance Rights of the Illegitimate Child: Lalli v. Lalli by Freytag, Sharon Nelson
SMU Law Review
Volume 33 | Issue 3 Article 5
1979
Equal Protection and the Inheritance Rights of the
Illegitimate Child: Lalli v. Lalli
Sharon Nelson Freytag
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholar.smu.edu/smulr
This Case Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at SMU Scholar. It has been accepted for inclusion in SMU Law Review
by an authorized administrator of SMU Scholar. For more information, please visit http://digitalrepository.smu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Sharon Nelson Freytag, Equal Protection and the Inheritance Rights of the Illegitimate Child: Lalli v. Lalli, 33 Sw L.J. 883 (1979)
https://scholar.smu.edu/smulr/vol33/iss3/5
NOTES
Equal Protection and the Inheritance Rights of the
Illegitimate Child: Lalli v. Lalli
Robert Lalli, the alleged illegitimate son of an intestate decedent,
brought suit against the decedent's administratrix in Surrogate's Court,
seeking a compulsory accounting of the decedent's estate. The claimant
urged that he and his sister, as the acknowledged illegitimate children of
the decedent,' were entitled to inherit from the decedent's estate. The ad-
ministratrix, widow of the decedent,2 argued that even if paternity was
conceded, the children nevertheless were not lawful distributees of the es-
tate because they had failed to comply with a New York statute3 that pre-
vents an illegitimate child from inheriting from its intestate father unless a
court of competent jurisdiction has entered, during the lifetime of the fa-
ther, an order of filiation declaring paternity.4 Robert Lalli contended that
this restriction discriminated against him on the basis of his illegitimate
birth, thereby denying him equal protection under the fourteenth amend-
ment.5 The Surrogate's Court upheld the constitutionality of the statute
and ruled that the alleged son was properly excluded as a distributee of the
estate and therefore lacked status to petition for a compulsory accounting.
The New York Court of Appeals ultimately upheld the statute,6 adhering
1. The decedent had provided financial support for the children and openly accepted
them as his own.
2. The widow, Rosamond Lalli, had been married to decedent, Mario Lalli, since
1939. Robert and Maureen Lalli, the children, were born in 1948 and 1950, respectively.
Their natural mother died in 1968, five years before the death of Mario Lalli. See In re
Lalli, 38 N.Y.2d 77, 78, 340 N.E.2d 721, 722, 387 N.Y.S.2d 351, 352-53 (1975).
3. N.Y. EST., POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 4-1.2(a)(2) (McKinney 1967).
4. Robert Lalli possessed a notarized certificate of parental consent to the marriage of
a minor child, signed by Mario Lalli at the time of Robert's marriage, that referred to Rob-
ert as Mario's "son." Robert also had several affidavits that stated Mario had openly ac-
knowledged Robert as his son.
5. A general principle of the equal protection clause is that persons similarly situated
should be treated similarly. See L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 993 (1978).
Robert Lalli argued that legitimate and illegitimate children are similarly situated with re-
gard to their relationship to their natural father and that illegitimate children should not be
required to produce judicial proof of paternity.
6. In re Lalli, 43 N.Y.2d 65, 371 N.E.2d 481, 400 N.Y.S.2d 761 (1977). The New York
Court of Appeals originally upheld the statute as it found a rational relationship between the
requirement of a judicial decree and the state's interest in proving paternity to insure the
orderly settlement of estates. 38 N.Y.2d 77, 340 N.E.2d 721, 372 N.Y.S.2d 351 (1975). Later,
while pending before the United States Supreme Court, the case was vacated and remanded
for reconsideration in light of the Supreme Court's decision in Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S.
762 (1977). In Trimble the Court invalidated an Illinois statute that required the acknowl-
edgement of an illegitimate child by the father and the marriage of the child's parents before
that child could inherit by intestate succession. On remand, the New York Court of Appeals
decided that § 4-1.2(a)(2) met the stricter scrutiny required by Trimble. See notes 45-50
infra and accompanying text.
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to the rationale that the statute's requirement for specific judicial proof of
paternity was constitutional. Robert Lalli appealed to the United States
Supreme Court. Held, affirmed: the requirement of a judicial declaration
of the paternity of the father imposed by the State of New York on illegiti-
mate children who would inherit from their fathers is substantially related
to the important state interest the statute is intended to promote and there-
fore does not violate the equal protection clause. Lalli v. Lali, 99 S. Ct.
518, 58 L. Ed. 2d 503 (1978).
I. HISTORICAL TREATMENT OF THE INHERITANCE RIGHTS OF
ILLEGITIMATE CHILDREN
At common law, the illegitimate child was the child of no one. Black-
stone described that child's plight: "The incapacity of a bastard consists
principally in this, that he cannot be heir to any one, neither can he have
heirs, but of his own body; for, being nulliusflius, he is therefore kin to
nobody, and has no ancestor from whom any inheritable blood can be
derived."7 Most states have relaxed the inflexibility of the common law
rule against inheritance by illegitimate children through adoption of stat-
utes that allow the illegitimate child to occupy the same position as the
legitimate child with respect to his mother.8 Inheritance by an illegitimate
child from an intestate father, however, is allowed usually only after the
father's marriage to the mother,9 after formal recognition or acknowledge-
ment of the child by the father,' ° or, in some instances, after an adjudica-
tion of paternity."1 In contrast, legitimate children can inherit from their
fathers without the necessity of formal acknowledgement, based on the
existence of their biological relationship. At present, only three states treat
both the illegitimate and the legitimate child as essentially equal for pur-
poses of inheritance.' 2
A constitutional challenge to the validity of state intestate succession
laws with separate classifications for legitimate and illegitimate children
7. 1 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 485 (1857), quoted
in Krause, Legitimate and Illegitimate Offspring of Levy v. Louisiana-First Decisions on
Equal Protection and Paternity, 36 U. CHI. L. REV. 338, 353-54 (1969). See generally H.
KRAUSE, ILLEGITIMACY: LAW AND SOCIAL POLICY (1971) for a discussion of the history
and development of the rights of the illegitimate child.
8. See, e.g., ARK. STAT. ANN. § 61-141(d) (1971); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 474.060 (Vernon
1956); TENN. CODE ANN. § 31-206(2) (1978); TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 42(a) (Vernon Supp.
1978- 1979).
9. See, e.g., Mo. STAT. ANN. § 474.070 (Vernon 1956); TENN. CODE ANN. § 31-
206(2)(a) (1978); TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 42(b) (Vernon Supp. 1978-1979).
10. See, e.g., CAL. PROB. CODE § 255 (West 1956); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 732.108(2)(c)
(West Supp. 1978); TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 42(c) (Vernon Supp. 1978-1979).
11. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 732.108(2)(b) (West 1976); TENN. CODE ANN. § 31-
206(2)(b) (1978). For background on illegitimate children's statutory inheritance rights, see
Krause, Bringing the Bastard into the Great Society-A Proposed Unform Act on Legitimacy,
44 TEXAS L. REV. 829, 854-56 (1966).
12. ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 14-2611 (1975); N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 30.1-04-09 (2-109) 2, 14-
17-02 to -04(4)(d) (1977); OR. REV. STAT. §§ 112.105, 109.060 (1977). Even in these states,




raises the difficult question of which standard of review applies. The War-
ren Court employed a two-tiered approach to the analysis of equal protec-
tion claims. ' 3 The first tier is a rational basis test: a statutory classification
is constitutional if it is rational and furthers a legitimate governmental
purpose. 4 Describing this rational basis test in McGowan v. Maryland,5
Chief Justice Warren emphasized that the equal protection clause permits
the states broad discretion in enacting laws that affect some groups of citi-
zens differently from others. He wrote: "A statutory discrimination will
not be set aside if any state of facts reasonably may be conceived to justify
it."' 6 Since most statutes easily can meet the minimal scrutiny of this test,
the rational basis approach has been characterized as "judicial abdica-
tion."' 7 The second tier involves a strict scrutiny test that applies when a
challenged statutory classification is based on suspect criteria' 8 or concerns
some fundamental right.'9 This approach requires the Court to analyze
rigorously the necessity of the classification as a means of accomplishing a
compelling state interest.2" Application of the strict scrutiny test generally
results in invalidation of the challenged statute.2' Thus, the Court's deter-
mination of the appropriate standard of review usually determines the fate
of the statute under attack.
The Supreme Court did not analyze discrimination against the illegiti-
mate child in terms of equal protection under the laws until 1968 in Levy v.
Louisiana.22 In Levy the Court struck down a Louisiana statute that de-
nied illegitimate children the right to recover for their mother's wrongful
death.23 Although the opinion of the Court used the language of the ra-
tional basis test,24 it also suggested the possibility of a fundamental right or
a suspect classification: "The rights asserted here involve the intimate, fa-
milial relationship between a child and his own mother. . . . [I]t is invidi-
ous to discriminate against [illegitimate children] when no action, conduct,
or demeanor of theirs is possibly relevant to the harm that was done the
13. For a discussion of the two-tiered approach and evolving equal protection stan-
dards, see Gunther, The Supreme Court, 1971 Term-Foreword" In Search of an Evolving
Doctrine on a Changing Court, A Modelfor a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REV. i
(1972).
14. See L. TRIBE, supra note 5, at 995. Under this approach, the party challenging the
statute has the burden of proving its irrationality.
15. 366 U.S. 420 (1961). See New Orleans v. Duke, 427 U.S. 297 (1976), for a recent
decision based on the rational basis test.
16. 366 U.S. at 425-26.
17. See Gunther, supra note 13, at 19.
18. See, e.g., Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (race). In Graham v. Richardson,
403 U.S. 365 (1971), the Court treated alienage as a suspect classification. But see Foley v.
Connelie, 435 U.S. 291 (1978).
19. See, e.g., Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966) (voting); Skinner
v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942) (procreation).
20. See Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 634 (1969).
21. See Gunther, supra note 13, at 8, for the statement that strict scrutiny is "strict" in
theory and "fatal" in fact.
22. 391 U.S. 68 (1968).
23. LA. CIv. CODE ANN. art. 2315 (West 1967).
24. 391 U.S. at 71.
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mother."25 In a companion case, Glona v. American Guarantee & Liability
Insurance Co.,26 the Court invalidated that part of the same Louisiana
statute that denied a mother's right to recover for the death of her illegiti-
mate son. Repeating Levy's emphasis on the intimate familial relationship
between the mother and child, the majority nevertheless unambiguously
stated that the standard used was the rational basis test;2 7 yet the statute
did not survive the Court's scrutiny, a result usually associated with more
rigorous analysis. During a decade of decisions 28 following Levy and
Glona, the proper equal protection standard for classifications based on
illegitimacy was not clearly defined, but the "all or nothing approach" 29 of
the two-tiered model gradually broadened to include a middle tier.
Three years after Levy and Glona, the Court in Labine v. Vincent3° up-
held a Louisiana statute 3 1 that prohibited an acknowledged illegitimate
child32 from inheriting from an intestate father when the father was sur-
vived by collateral heirs. The Court determined that the statute created no
insurmountable barrier to inheritance by the illegitimate daughter since
the father could have provided for her by will, married her mother, or
stated in his acknowledgement of paternity his desire to legitimate his
daughter.33 Justice Black, writing for the majority, emphasized that a state
may establish its own rules for the protection of family life and for the
disposition of property.34 Because of the Court's deference to the state
legislature, the equal protection analysis in Labine was perfunctory and
25. Id at 71-72 (footnotes omitted). One commentator maintains that strict scrutiny
has been applied to statutory classifications based on illegitimacy since Levy. See L. TRIBE,
supra note 5, at 1057.
26. 391 U.S. 73 (1968); see Krause, supra note 7, for a discussion of the effects of Levy
and Glona. See also Gray & Rudovsky, The Court Acknowledges the Illegitimate.- Levy v.
Louisiana and Glona v. American Guarantee & Liab. Ins. Co., 118 U. PA. L. REV. 1 (1969).
27. 391 U.S. at 75.
28. Before Lalli, the Court reviewed the constitutionality of alleged discrimination on
the basis of legitimacy thirteen times: Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787 (1977); Trimble v.
Gordon, 430 U.S. 762 (1977); Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495 (1976); Jiminez v. Wein-
berger, 417 U.S. 628 (1974); New Jersey Welfare Rights Org. v. Cahill, 411 U.S. 619 (1973);
Gomez v. Perez, 409 U.S. 535 (1973); Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164 (1972);
Labine v. Vincent, 401 U.S. 532 (1971); Glona v. American Guar. & Liab. Ins. Co., 391 U.S.
73 (1968); Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68 (1968); Beaty v. Weinberger, 478 F.2d 300 (5th Cir.
1973), summarily affid, 418 U.S. 901 (1974); Griffin v. Richardson, 346 F. Supp. 1226 (D.
Md.), summarily affd, 409 U.S. 1069 (1972); Davis v. Richardson, 342 F. Supp. 588 (D.
Conn.), afd, 409 U.S. 1069 (1972). For a review of these decisions, see Stenger, The
Supreme Court and Illegitimacy.- 1968-1977, 11 FAM. L.Q. 365 (1978).
29. Wilkinson, The Supreme Court, The Equal Protection Clause, and The Three Faces of
Constitutional Equality, 61 VA. L. REV. 945, 1017 (1975).
30. 401 U.S. 532 (1971).
31. LA. CIv. CODE ANN. art. 919 (West 1967).
32. The child had lived with the mother and father, was acknowledged by the father,
and was the only child of the father.
33. 401 U.S. at 539.
34. Justice Black stressed:
[T]he choices reflected by the [Louisiana] intestate succession statute are
choices which it is within the power of the State to make. The Federal Consti-
tution does not give this Court the power to overturn the State's choice under
the guise of constitutional interpretation because the Justices of this Court be-
lieve that they can provide better rules.
Id at 537.
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did not require the succession statute to meet any standard at all.35 In a
footnote, however, the Court concluded that the Louisiana statute would
satisfy the rational basis test if it were applied.36
Considering the decisions in Levy and Glona," one writer commented
that the decision in Labine was only a temporary setback in the expansion
of rights for illegitimate children.38 That interpretation appeared well-
founded in light of the Court's decision a year later in Weber v. Aetna
Casualty & Surety Co.39 Invalidating a statute that denied worker's com-
pensation benefits to unacknowledged illegitimate children, the Court sug-
gested a balancing process in equal protection analysis: "The essential
inquiry . . . is . . .inevitably a dual one: What legitimate state interest
does the classification promote? What fundamental personal rights might
the classification endanger?"4 With this new method of inquiry, the
Court exhibited a move away from the minimal scrutiny of the rational
basis test toward an intermediate standard of review.4 In Mathews v. Lu-
cas42 the Court described the evolving intermediate level of analysis as
"less than strictest scrutiny" but more than "toothless" scrutiny.43 Fur-
thermore, the Court explicitly stated that illegitimate children are not a
suspect class because "discrimination against illegitimates has never ap-
proached the severity or pervasiveness of the historic legal and political
discrimination against women and Negroes."44
In Trimble v. Gordon45 the Supreme Court relied on the intermediate
35. But see Comment, Illegitimacy and Equal Protection.- Two Tiers Or An Analytical
Grab-Bag?, 7 Loy. CHI. L.J. 754 (1976), for the proposition that Labine could be read as
implying the emergence of a new test more deferential than the rational basis test.
36. 401 U.S. at 536 n.6: "Even if we were to apply the 'rational basis' test to the Louisi-
ana intestate succession statute, that statute clearly has a rational basis in view of Louisiana's
interest in promoting family life and of directing the disposition of property left within the
State."
37. Justice Black, writing for the majority in Labine, did distinguish Levy, noting that it
involved the state legislature's creation of a statutory tort while Labine involved property
rights incident to family life. Id at 535-36.
38. See Petrillo, Labine v. Vincent- Illegitimates, Inheritance, and the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, 75 DICK. L. REV. 377, 379 (1971).
39. 406 U.S. 164 (1972).
40. Id at 173.
41. id at 172 (citations omitted): "[T]his Court requires, at a minimum, that a statutory
classification bear some rational relationship to a legitimate state purpose . . . . [Wihen
classifications avproach sensitive and fundamental personal rights, this Court exercises a
stricter scrutiny. See Karst, The Supreme Court, 1976 Term-Foreword" Equal Citizenship
Under the Fourteenth Amendment, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1, 177-88 (1977), for a discussion of
this intermediate standard of scrutiny in other equal protection cases. See also L. TRIBE,
supra note 5, at 1077.
42. 427 U.S. 495 (1976). In Lucas the Court upheld a statute that conditioned entitle-
ment to Social Security disability benefits on proof of an unacknowledged illegitimate
child's dependency at the time of the wage earner's death.
43. Id at 510.
44. Id at 506. Sex, however, still has not been considered a suspect class by a majority
of the Court. See note 56 infra.
45. 430 U.S. 762 (1977). For discussion of this decision, see Note, "Legitimate" Discrim-
ination Against Illegitimates." A Look at Trimble v. Gordon and Fiallo v. Bell, 16 J. FAM. L. 57
(1977); Note, Constitutional Law-Equal Protection and the Inheritance Rights of Illegitimates
Under Intestate Succession Laws, 43 Mo. L. REV. 116 (1978); Note, Constitutional Law-
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mode of analysis in Lucas when the Court reviewed an Illinois statute that
permitted an illegitimate child to inherit from his intestate father only if
the father had acknowledged the child and the child had been legitimated
by the marriage of the parents.46 The Illinois Supreme Court had relied
on the statement in Labine that the state had a legitimate interest in the
orderly distribution of property at death and therefore upheld the constitu-
tionality of the statute. The United States Supreme Court, however, deter-
mined that the statute was not related closely enough to this asserted state
interest to withstand judicial scrutiny:
The [Illinois] court failed to consider the possibility of a middle
ground between the extremes of complete exclusion [of the illegiti-
mate from inheritance] and case-by-case determination of paternity.
For at least some significant categories of illegitimate children of in-
testate men, inheritance rights can be recognized without jeopardizing
the orderly settlement of estates or the dependability of titles to prop-
erty passing under intestacy laws.47
In reaching this conclusion, the Court neither clearly distinguished nor ex-
pressly overruled Labine,48 which involved a similar fact situation. Justice
Powell, writing for the majority in Trimble, recognized that the Illinois
statute in Trimble had been examined more critically than the Louisiana
statute in Labine and directed that the more recent method of analysis
controlled.4 9 Yet he failed to articulate specifically the appropriate level of
scrutiny to be applied.5"
Equal Protection-Equal Protection Clause Limits Discrimination Against llegitimates Claim-
ing Under Their Intestate Fathers' Estates, Trimble v. Gordon, 97 S Ct. 1459 (1977), 9 TEX.
TECH L. REV. 113 (1977); Note, Constitutional Law--Equal Protection-State's Denial of
Right to Inherit Intestate Succession Based on Illegitimate Status Invalidated, 52 TUL. L.
REV. 406 (1978); Note, Illegitimate Succession-Illinois Statute Denying the Rights of Illegiti-
mate Children to Inheritfrom Father's Estate Is Unconstitutional, Trimble v. Gordon, 97 S. Ct.
1459 (1977), 13 TULSA L.J. 178 (1977).
46. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 3, § 12 (1973).
47. 430 U.S. at 770-7 1.
48. See notes 30-36 supra and accompanying text. The Court did explain that the Loui-
siana statute in Labine did not discriminate against all illegitimate children but only those
not legitimated. The Illinois statute, on the other hand, resulted in complete discrimination
since there was no provision for legitimation. Yet in a footnote to the majority opinion, the
Court recognized that "Labine v. Vincent . . . is difficult to place in the pattern of this
Court's equal protection decisions, and subsequent cases have limited its force as a prece-
dent." 430 U.S. at 767 n.12.
49. 430 U.S. at 776 n.17. One writer suggested that after the decision in Trimble, Labine
was no longer good law. L. TRIBE, supra note 5, at 1058. See note 88 infra for a comment
on Lalli's effect on that writer's conclusion.
50. See Justice Rehnquist's dissent, 430 U.S. at 781-82, for the opinion that the Court's
analysis causes confusion because it does not set out the precise level of scrutiny to be used
for classifications based on illegitimacy. See also Comment, Constitutional Law--Ilegti-
macy--Intestate Succession-Trimble v. Gordon, 23 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 329, 338 (1977).
But see Note, ConstitutionalLaw. Equal Protectionfor Illegitimates, 17 WASHBURN L.J. 392,
397 (1978), in which the writer defines the equal protection scrutiny in Trimble as "intensi-
fied means scrutiny." See also Note, Constitutional Law-Equal Protection-Illegitimacy
Classifications Require Reasonably Strict Scrutiny-Trimble v. Gordon, 97 S Ct. 1459 (1977),
11 CREIGHTON L. REV. 609, 614 (1977), in which the writer calls the intermediate level of
analysis in Trimble "reasonably strict scrutiny."
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NOTES
II. LALLI V. LALLI
In La//i v. La/i the Supreme Court reviewed the constitutionality of a
New York statute that required judicial proof of paternity before an illegit-
imate could inherit from an intestate father.5 ' Justice Powell, writing for
the plurality, 2 supported the equal protection approach enunciated in
Trimble to the extent that classifications based on illegitimacy are not sub-
ject to strict scrutiny,53 but added that these classifications are invalid
under the fourteenth amendment if they are not "substantially related to
permissible state interests."54 The plurality,55 therefore, clearly articulated
the intermediate test for classifications based on illegitimacy: a "substan-
tial relationship" test56 falling between the extremes of minimal scrutiny
and strict scrutiny.57 To withstand this test, a statute must further the state
interest with minimal impact on the rights of illegitimate children.58 In
51. N.Y. EST., POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 4-I.2(a)(2) (McKinney 1967) provides:
An illegitimate child is the legitimate child of his father so that he and his
issue inherit from his father if a court of competent jurisdiction has, during the
lifetime of the father, made an order of filiation declaring paternity in a pro-
ceeding instituted during the pregnancy of the mother or within two years
from the birth of the child.
52. Justice Powell was joined in his opinion by Chief Justice Burger and Justice Stewart
and joined in the judgment by Justices Blackmun and Rehnquist.
53. Id at 523, 58 L. Ed. 2d at 509.
54. Id The plurality stated in Lalli that the "substantial relationship" test had actually
been applied in Trimb/e. Id The Trimble Court had cited Reed v. Reed, 400 U.S. 71 (1971),
as the appropriate analytical approach to statutes involving the disposition of property at
death. 430 U.S. at 767 n. 12. Reed, a case involving gender discrimination, required that a
statute bear a fair and substantial relation to the object of legislation. Justice Rehnquist,
dissenting in Trimble, expressed the fear that the majority was returning to the substantial
relationship test used in the 1920's. Id at 784. See Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253 U.S.
412, 415 (1920).
55. Justice Powell again emphasized this test in the final paragraph of the opinion. 99
S. Ct. at 528, 58 L. Ed. 2d at 516. Justice Brennan, dissenting, also employed the substantial
relationship test. 99 S. Ct. at 530, 58 L. Ed. 2d at 518.
56. The Court articulated the same standard for gender-based classifications in Craig v.
Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976), stating: "[Cilassifications by gender must serve important gov-
ernment objectives and must be substantially related to the achievement of those objec-
tives." Id at 197 (emphasis added). Although Justice Powell also spoke of "important"
state interests, 99 S. Ct. at 528, 58 L. Ed. 2d at 516, he used the adjective interchangeably
with the word "permissible," 99 S. Ct. at 523, 58 L. Ed. 2d at 509. Commentators on Craig
emphasized the Court's choice of the word "important" as one indicator of the Court's
heightened scrutiny of the statute's purpose. See, e.g., L. TRIBE, supra note 5, at 1082; Karst,
supra note 41, at 54.
57. See Karst, supra note 41, at 186-88, in which the author asserted that the Court had
been using a balancing technique in middle-tier analysis of illegitimacy and sex classifica-
tions so that, instead of measuring these classifications against an absolute standard of sub-
stantiality, the Court has engaged in a process of comparing the challenged statute with
alternative considerations that avoid an illegitimacy or sex classification and then balancing
the results against the invidiousness of the particular classification. In that writer's opinion,
the balancing process is ad hoc in nature, having no clearly defined factors: "If 'substantial-
ity' is in fact being ascertained by a balancing process, the Court should explain more clearly
the factors that enter into its determination and the process by which these factors are
weighed. Otherwise, the intermediate level of scrutiny will remain a mask for an unex-
plained process of adjudication." Id at 188.
58. Professor Tribe characterizes five techniques encompassed by intermediate review:
(1) assessing importance, (2) demanding close fit, (3) requiring current articulation, (4) limit-
1979]
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Lalli the plurality succeeded in finding a substantial relationship between
the statute and a legitimate state interest.
The plurality began its analysis of the New York statute with a review of
its decision in Trimble v. Gordon.59 Justice Powell distinguished the New
York statute from the Illinois statute in Trimble on two grounds. First, he
noted that the Illinois statute required both the father's acknowledgement
of paternity and the legitimation of the child through the marriage of the
parents before allowing inheritance by the child. Thus, even though the
parent-child relationship in Trimble had been judicially established in a
paternity hearing, the illegitimate child was denied inheritance under the
statute because the parents had not married. In contrast, the New York
statute required only a judicial declaration of paternity before the father's
death. Secondly, the plurality differentiated the state interests the two stat-
utes purported to serve. Whereas the Illinois law stated the dual purpose
of encouraging family relationships6" and insuring the orderly distribution
of property of estates, the New York statute was directed at the latter goal
only.6' Therefore, the Court examined the procedural demands of the
statute62 only in terms of its "substantial relation" to the primary state
interest of providing for the just and orderly disposition of property at
death.
Focusing on the unique and difficult problems of proof of paternity in-
volved when an illegitimate child seeks to inherit from his father, Justice
Powell stated that accuracy would be enhanced by resolving paternity dis-
putes in a judicial forum prior to the father's death.63 He reasoned that the
reliability of such a judicial order would prevent fraudulent claims during
the administration of an estate.64 Justice Powell emphasized that the intes-
ing afterthought, and (5) permitting rebuttal. For a discussion of these techniques, see L.
TRIBE, supra note 5, at 1082-89.
59. 430 U.S. 762 (1977).
60. In Weber the Court rejected the argument that statutes penalizing illegitimate chil-
dren are defensible as incentives for parents to enter legitimate family relationships. The
Court stated:
The status of illegitimacy has expressed through the ages society's condemna-
tion of irresponsible liasions beyond the bonds of marriage. But visiting this
condemnation on the head of an infant is illogical and unjust. Moreover, im-
posing disabilities on the illegitimate child is contrary to the basic concept of
our system that legal burdens should bear some relationship to individual re-
sponsibility or wrongdoing. Obviously, no child is responsible for his birth
and penalizing the illegitimate child is an ineffectual-as well as an unjust-
way of deterring the parent.
406 U.S. at 175. But see Parham v. Hughes, 99 S. Ct. 1742, 1746-47, 60 L. Ed. 2d 269, 275-76
(1979), in which the Court justified penalizing the putative father.
61. Perhaps in reaction to Weber, the court of appeals denied that the purpose of the
New York statute was to discourage illegitimacy, mold human conduct, or set societal
norms. 43 N.Y.2d 65, 70, 371 N.E.2d 481, 483, 400 N.Y.S.2d 761, 764 (1977).
62. The plurality limited its decision to the constitutionality of that part of the New
York statute requiring that a judicial order of filiation be issued during the lifetime of the
father of an illegitimate child. It reserved judgment on the constitutionality of that part of
the statute requiring that the order be made within two years of the child's birth since that
issue was not before the Court. 99 S. Ct. at 524 n.5, 58 L. Ed. 2d at 510 n.5.
63. Id. at 526, 58 L. Ed. 2d at 513.
64. This state interest in preventing fraudulent claims was also discussed in Parham v.
[Vol. 33
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tate statute under review was drafted by the Bennett Commission, a group
created by the New York Legislature to conduct a comprehensive study of
certain areas of state law, including the descent and distribution of prop-
erty. According to the Commission's report,65 the proposed statute served
to alleviate the plight of the illegitimate child while mitigating serious diffi-
culties in the administration of estates. Therefore, the statute in question
resulted from the legislature's careful consideration of the proper balance
between the rights of the illegitimate child and the state's interest in prov-
ing paternity to prevent fraudulent claims.
Although states are free to require proof of paternity other than by judi-
cial decree,66 the plurality stated that the proof should be a "regularly pre-
scribed, legally recognized 67 method of acknowledging paternity. Justice
Powell indicated that the state's interest in safeguarding the accurate and
orderly disposition of property at death could be frustrated easily if there
were a constitutional requirement that any notarized yet unsworn state-
ment68 identifying an individual as the decedent's "child" had to be ac-
cepted as adequate proof of paternity regardless of the context in which the
statement was made.69
Justice Brennan, writing for the dissent, 7° disagreed as to the type of
proof constitutionally required.71 The dissent contended that New York's
judicial order requirement would make it virtually impossible for ac-
knowledged and freely supported illegitimate children to inherit from in-
testate fathers for several practical reasons: 72 (1) social welfare agencies
concerned with errant fathers are not likely to bring paternity proceedings
against fathers who support their children;73 (2) acknowledged children
Hughes, 99 S. Ct. 1742, 60 L. Ed. 2d 269 (1979), in which the Court upheld a statute denying
the putative father an action for the wrongful death of his illegitimate child even though the
father could prove paternity.
65. FOURTH REPORT OF THE TEMPORARY STATE COMMISSION ON THE MODERNIZA-
TION, REVISION AND SIMPLIFICATION OF THE LAW OF ESTATES, Legis. Doc. 1965, No. 19
(1965).
66. 99 S. Ct. at 526 n.8, 58 L. Ed. 2d at 513 n.8.
67. 1d at 528 n.i 1, 58 L. Ed. 2d at 515 n.l 1. The plurality stressed that such a regularly
prescribed, legally recognized method of acknowledging paternity was the kind of "formal
acknowledgement" contemplated in Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. at 772 n.14. Although not
specifying what alternative types of proof would suffice, the plurality rejected the notarized
marriage "Certificate of Consent" possessed by Robert Lalli as a valid acknowledgement of
paternity even though it contained Mario Lalli's signature and a clear reference to "my son
Robert." In the plurality's opinion, since the certificate was not intended to prove biological
paternity, the use of "my son" was ambiguous.
68. The lower court opinion differed from the Supreme Court opinion in stating that the
writing was sworn to. In re Lalli, 38 N.Y.2d 77, 78, 340 N.E.2d 721, 722, 378 N.Y.S.2d 351,
352 (1975).
69. 99 S. Ct. at 528 n.l, 58 L. Ed. 2d at 515 n.l. But cf. Caban v. Mohammed, 99 S.
Ct. 1760, 60 L. Ed. 2d 297 (1979), also a New York case, involving adoption rights of a
putative father, in which the Court accepted the father's name on the birth certificate and his
support of the illegitimate child as valid proof of paternity.
70. Justices White, Marshall, and Stevens joined in the dissent.
71. 99 S. Ct. at 528 n.ll, 58 L. Ed. 2d at 515 n.ll.
72. Id at 529, 58 L. Ed. 2d at 517.
73. But see MINN. STAT. ANN. § 257.33 (1971), which provides:
It shall be the duty of the commissioner of public welfare when notified of a
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are unlikely to bring paternity proceedings against their fathers because of
a lack of need and a fear of provoking disharmony; (3) mothers are un-
likely to bring proceedings against a father for these same reasons; and (4)
fathers who fail to make even a rudimentary will are not likely to bring
formal filiation proceedings. Justice Brennan suggested that in addition to
a formal acknowledgement of paternity other than a judicial order, a state
could require an elevated standard of proof 1 to prevent fraudulent
claims. The requirement of an order of filiation declaring paternity would
bar unnecessarily the claim of an acknowledged illegitimate child such as
Robert Lalli, who had no reason to bring a paternity action during his
father's lifetime and was barred from satisfying the statutory requirement
after his father's death. Therefore, the dissent argued that the requirement
of the New York statute was overbroad, unconstitutionally discriminating
against illegitimate children by excluding forms of proof that do not com-
promise the state's interests.75
The plurality conceded that the New York statute might operate un-
fairly against a small number of illegitimate children76 who otherwise
might be able to prove their relationship to their fathers without compli-
ance with the judicial order requirement and without serious disruption of
the administration of estates.7 7 Nevertheless, the plurality reasoned that
the "inquiry under the Equal Protection Clause does not focus on the ab-
stract 'fairness' of a state law,78 but on whether the statute's relation to the
woman who is delivered of an illegitimate child, or pregnant with child likely
to be illegitimate when born, to take care that the interests of the child are
safeguarded, that appropriate steps are taken to establish his paternity ....
74. Justice Brennan suggested that the illegitimate child might bear the burden of prov-
ing paternity by "clear and convincing evidence, or even beyond a reasonable doubt." 99 S.
Ct. at 530, 58 L. Ed. 2d at 518.
75. Id (quoting Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762, 772 n.14 (1977)).
76. The plurality rejected appellant's contention that the statute, in conjunction with
N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 24 (McKinney 1967), unconstitutionally discriminated between
classes of illegitimate children. Section 24 provides that a child conceived out of wedlock is
legitimate if, before or after birth, his parents marry, even if the marriage is void, illegal, or
judicially annulled. Appellant argued that children legitimated in that manner escaped the
rigor of the requirement of a judicial order of paternity before intestate inheritance is per-
mitted. The plurality, however, saw no unconstitutional discrimination between the two
classes of illegitimate children, reasoning that the child legitimated under § 24 would have
to prove not only paternity but also maternity and the marriage of his parents. Therefore,
less exacting proof of paternity would be acceptable because of the additional evidentiary
requirements. Earlier in its decision, however, the Court emphasized the ease with which
the maternity of a child can be proved. "Establishing maternity is seldom difficult ...
'[T]he birth of the child is a recorded or registered event usually taking place in the presence
of others.' " 99 S. Ct. at 525, 58 L. Ed. 2d at 511 (quoting In re Orwitz, 60 Misc. 2d 756, 761,
303 N.Y.S.2d 806, 812 (Sup. Ct. 1969)). Likewise, a marriage between parents of an illegiti-
mate child would be a recorded event and easily proved.
77. 99 S. Ct. at 527, 58 L. Ed. 2d at 514.
78. The Court focused on the liberal interpretation the statute has been given by New
York courts in refusing to exclude illegitimate children from inheritance because of techni-
cal failures in complying with the statute. Id. In all of the cases cited, however, some previ-
ous judicial determination of paternity was present. See In re Kennedy, 89 Misc. 2d 551,
392 N.Y.S.2d 365 (1977); In re Niles, 53 A.D.2d 983, 385 N.Y.S.2d 876 (1976), appealdenied,
40 N.Y.2d 809, 360 N.E.2d 1109, 392 N.Y.S.2d 1027 (1977). In addition, the plurality, in
permitting the required judicial order, cannot be certain that all courts would be so liberal in
the application of such a statute.
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state interests it is intended to promote is so tenuous that it lacks the ra-
tionality contemplated by the Fourteenth Amendment. ' 79 Justice Powell's
opinion echoed the state deference principle enunciated in Labine8° and
emphasized that the function of the Court was not to "hypothesize. . . on
the desirability or feasibility of any possible alternative[s]"'" to the statu-
tory scheme formulated by New York. Rather, those "matters of practical
judgment and empirical calculation"'82 were state responsibilities. The
plurality did, however, attempt to reconcile Labine with Trimble by reaf-
firming that no deference would be given to state statutes like the Illinois
statute in Trimble, where despite the legitimate state interest in orderly
disposition of property at death, the statute broadly disqualified significant
categories of illegitimate children of intestate men whose inheritance rights
could be determined without jeopardizing the orderly settlement of es-
tates.83
Justice Blackmun, in an opinion concurring in the judgment, remained
unconvinced that the holdings in Labine and Trimble could be reconciled.
He interpreted the decision in Lalli as providing solid support for the prin-
ciples previously set forth in Labine and thus would overrule Trimble, a
"derelict" that he believed provided little precedent for constitutional anal-
ysis of state intestate succession laws.8 4 Justice Stewart, in a concurring
opinion, agreed with the plurality's explanation of the differences between
the Illinois statute in Trimble and the New York statute in Lali and dis-
agreed with Justice Blackmun that Trimble was a derelict.85 Justice Rehn-
quist concurred with the judgment based on his dissent in Trimble in
which he opposed a broad reading of the equal protection clause that
would permit judicial intervention to change legislative judgment.86 He,
like Justice Blackmun, would adopt the principles set forth in Labine.
The plurality opinion in La//i, coupled with the decisions in Labine and
Trimble, provides lower courts with inconclusive guidelines as to the level
of scrutiny the Court will apply to state intestacy statutes involving illegiti-
macy classifications.87 In Labine the Court exhibited marked deference
toward the legislature. In Trimble, however, the Court engaged in a rigor-
79. 99 S. Ct. at 527, 58 L. Ed. 2d at 514. In making this statement, the plurality com-
bined the language of the rational basis test with its substantial relationship test.
80. See note 34 supra and accompanying text. Justice Warren approved that deference
in McGowan. See notes 15-16 supra and accompanying text.
81. 99 S. Ct. at 528, 58 L. Ed. 2d at 515 (quoting Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495, 515
(1976)).
82. 99 S. Ct. at 528, 58 L. Ed. 2d at 515.
83. Id. at 523, 58 L. Ed. 2d at 510 (quoting Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762, 771
(1977)). The plurality stated that the New York statute's requirement did not "inevitably
disqualifly] an unnecessarily large number of children born out of wedlock." 99 S. Ct. at
527, 58 L. Ed. 2d at 514.
84. 99 S. Ct. at 529, 58 L. Ed. 2d at 517.
85. Id.
86. 430 U.S. 762, 777 (1977).
87. For a discussion of the binding effect upon state courts of an opinion of the United
States Supreme Court supported by less than a majority of all its members, see Annot. 65
A.L.R.3d 504 (1975).
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ous scrutiny of the statute. In La/i 88 the Court purportedly used the same
intermediate, heightened level of scrutiny as in Trimble, but exhibited the
deferential attitude of the Labine court. With this ambiguous precedent,
89
the type of "regularly prescribed, legally recognized" 90 proof 9' permitted
when illegitimate children seek to inherit from intestate fathers will have
to be determined on a case-by-case basis since states cannot be certain
what middle ground of circumstances 9z referred to in Trimble will insure
that a statute satisfies the Court's substantial relationship test.
The Court did suggest that requiring a judicial order of paternity to be
made within two years of the birth of the child could be constitutionally
challenged. 93 Such a requirement puts the illegitimate infant in a situation
over which he has no control,94 reminiscent of classifications based on race
and national origin. One author has suggested that the Supreme Court
recognize illegitimacy as a suspect classification, thus requiring the strictest
scrutiny of state intestate statutes.95 "No excuse remains to continue the
disabilities and prejudices of another day at the expense of today's chil-
88. The Court in Lalli refers to Labine, making clear that the two cases coexist with
Trimble in providing guidelines for equal protection analysis. 99 S. Ct. at 525, 58 L. Ed. 2d
at 511.
89. The alignment of the Court in any constitutional challenge is obviously critical.
Justice Powell, who wrote the majority opinion in Trimble, aligned himself with Justices
Brennan, White, Marshall, and Stevens; in Lalli, Justice Powell wrote the plurality opinion,
joined by Chief Justice Burger and Justice Rehnquist and joined in the judgment by Justices
Blackmun and Stewart. The Justices agreeing with Justice Powell in the majority opinion in
Trimble formed the dissent in La//i.
90. 99 S. Ct. at 528 n.ll, 58 L. Ed. 2d at 515 n.1l.
91. Improved methods of blood testing make paternity more easily ascertainable. For
recent decisions in the field of serology, see Larson, Blood Test Exclusion Proceedings in
Paternity Litigation. The Uniform Acts and Beyond, 13 J. FAM. L. 713 (1973-1974). See also
S. SCHATKIN, DISPUTED PATERNITY PROCEEDINGS (1975).
92. See text accompanying note 47 supra. See White v. Randolph, 59 Ohio St. 2d 6,
391 N.E.2d 333 (1979), in which the Ohio Supreme Court upheld a state statute permitting
inheritance by an illegitimate child from the natural father only after the father married the
mother, acknowledged the child, designated the child as heir at law, adopted the child, or
provided for the child in a will. Citing La/li, the court determined that the requirements of
the statute were substantially related to the important state interest of providing for the just
and orderly distribution of property at death. 391 N.E.2d at 337. The court decided that the
statute's five alternatives provided the reasonable middle ground that Trimble dictated. In a
vigorous dissent, Justice Palmer argued that the Ohio statute placed the ability to inherit
beyond the control of the illegitimate child and in the control of the putative father and thus
provided no middle ground at all. Id at 336-37.
93. The New York Court of Appeals declined to consider the appellant's challenge to
that part of the statute containing the two-year limitation because the appellant did not have
a judicial order to fulfill the other requirement of the statute. 38 N.Y.2d 77, 80, 340 N.E.2d
721, 724, 378 N.Y.S.2d 351, 354 (1975). The appellate court suggested that had the appellant
possessed a judicial order, the time limit would have become relevant. The Supreme Court,
using the same reasoning, also reviewed only one segment of the statute rather than the
statute as a whole. See note 62 supra. If the Court had considered the two-year limitation,
however, the appellant's case would have been substantially strengthened and that provision
of the statute almost certainly would have been invalidated.
94. The illegitimate child should be allowed to bring a paternity action in his own right
whether such an action has been previously brought or whether a statute of limitations
would bar such an action if it were brought by the persons authorized to bring the paternity
action under current statutes. See H. KRAUSE, supra note 7, at 151.
95. See Comment, Illegitimates andEqual Protection, 10 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 543, 553-54
(1977).
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